conomic and epidemiological research has linked social networks to health. People who report themselves to be socially isolated, both in the number and quality of their personal relationships, face a higher mortality risk from all causes. In particular, they face a greater risk of death from several infectious, neoplastic, and cardiovascular diseases (e.g., Caspi et al.
Mikulincer, and Hobfoll 1986) . Alternatively or in addition to the direct effect, social support may have a stress-buffering effect; that is, it aids stress resistance under high-stress conditions but has little effect under low-stress conditions (Hobfoll and Walfi sch 1984; Wilcox 1981) .
During wartime, men in more cohesive companies may code social support as physical safety (Shay 2002:210) and be less likely to develop PTSD. Consider that Capt. Frank Hollinger of the 19th USCT wrote, "I have always found comforting in battle the companionship of a friend, one in whom you had confi dence, one you felt assured would stand by you until the last" (quoted by Hess 1997:117) . Alternatively, friends might provide emotional consolation: they could provide exoneration for killing and the promise that they would not be forgotten and could decrease men's fear of death. After World War II, Audie Murphy (1949:158) wrote of his experiences, "At this moment the grave seems merely an open door that divides us from our comrades."
Quantitative evidence on social networks and PTSD comes from the Yom Kippur War, when the unexpected attack led men to fi ght in different tank crews. PTSD rates immediately after the war were higher among men who did not end up with their usual tank crew in the chaos to get to the front (Belenky, Noy, and Solomon 1987; Gal 1986:217) . But a tank crew is more likely than an infantry company to lose either all or none of its men. Among the men of an infantry company, being in a more cohesive company might worsen the effects of stress if men lose those who are close to them.
Shell shock, combat fatigue, and post-traumatic stress (all names for the same phenomenon in different wars) were not recognized as disorders during the Civil War (for a history of PTSD, see Hyams, Wignall, and Roswell 1996) . Not fl inching under enemy bullets was viewed as a test of manhood, and those who failed courted contempt (McPherson 1997:77-78) . Nonetheless, Oliver Wendell Holmes could write in 1864, "I tell you that many a man has gone crazy since the end of this campaign began from the terrible pressure on mind & body" (quoted in McPherson 1997:165) . McPherson (1997:166) described how "after eighteen hours of continuous combat at the Bloody Angle of Spotsylvania, a Union lieutenant the next morning found enemy soldiers piled three or four deep in the trenches, mostly dead, but 'one Rebel sat up praying at the top of his voice and others were gibbering in insanity.'" Historical accounts are relatively silent on whether Civil War trauma left a lasting effect. Most diaries cease with the end of the war. Dean (1997) argued for a lasting effect of wartime trauma but based his fi nding on a biased sample of Civil War veterans who were in soldiers' homes. Drawing from the same database as our study, Pizarro, Silver, and Prause (2006) found that the fraction of the company who died during the war affected the probability of cardiac and gastrointestinal disease among the survivors, but not older age mortality. However, because half of all Civil War deaths were from disease, Pizarro et al. may have measured the effects of wartime illness on later disease outcomes.
1 They might not have found an effect of company wartime mortality on older age mortality because of the way they constructed their sample. 2 We observe men during the war and then from about 1900 onward, when roughly 90% of all white veterans were on the pension rolls and therefore enter our data set (Costa 1. Most of their cardiac disease category consists of heart disease that resulted from rheumatic fever (Costa 2000) and is therefore unlikely to be linked to wartime trauma. Pizarro et al. (2006) did not control for specifi c wartime illnesses, even though these data are available.
2. They restricted the sample to men who lived until 1890 or later but did not restrict the sample to men who were on the pension rolls by 1890. Because all date-of-death information comes from the pension rolls, men are not at risk to die until they are on the pension rolls. Analysis time therefore needs to begin at the time men enter the pension rolls. In addition, Pizarro et al. (2006) would not have found an effect of the fraction of the company who died on older age mortality if, because of soldiers' changing companies, the fraction of the company who died becomes a poor indicator of a veteran's wartime experience. 1998:198) . Short of insanity that led to commitment to an asylum (of which there are very few cases), senile dementia, or the aftermaths of stroke, we cannot observe psychiatric disorders. (Because PTSD was accepted into the diagnostic literature only in 1980, we never observe who had PTSD.) We also cannot observe any health effects of trauma until men entered the pension rolls. However, we would expect stronger effects of psychiatric disorders on mortality from natural causes and on cardiovascular health at older ages because cardiovascular problems increase with age.
EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK
We begin by examining the effect of wartime stress on older age mortality. We investigate the use of different measures of battlefi eld stress, such as fraction of the company dying of wounds, number of the company dying of wounds, number of the regiment killed in action, maximum number of men in a regiment killed in a single engagement, and logarithms of these quantities, to account for potential nonlinearities. These measures refl ect differences in the strength of ties between men (presumably stronger in a company than in a regiment because companies were more of a local neighborhood), in the nature of the trauma (a single, big traumatic event versus a repetition of the trauma), and in localized stress levels. Although the regiment was sent into battle as a unit, companies could have different battle experiences because their locations on the battlefi eld differed.
Using the year 1900 as our baseline period (when the majority of veterans were between ages 55 and 64), we estimate a Gompertz hazard model of time until death in years:
where s is a measure of stress and c is a measure of company cohesion. 3 If β s > 0 (or if the hazard ratio exp(β s ) > 1), then stress increases older age mortality. The vector of control variables, x, includes age in 1900 and measures of wartime experience and socioeconomic status.
If stress affects the mortality experience of only those veterans who develop psychiatric disorders, then our estimate of β s captures both the probability of developing psychiatric disorders (an unobservable) and the effects of psychiatric disorders on older age mortality. Because men could avoid wartime stress by straggling (remaining in the rear, an unobservable), we may underestimate the effect of our stress measure on older age mortality because it no longer proxies for men's actual wartime experience. Men could also avoid wartime stress by deserting. Many deserters are lost to follow-up because they never returned to their units and were ineligible for the pension, which provides a record of their death. If deserters were inherently at greater risk to develop psychiatric disorders, then the effect of stress will be underestimated.
Once we establish which measure of stress best predicts older age mortality, our primary specifi cation becomes the Gompertz hazard model of time until death in years:
where the only difference with our previous specifi cation is the inclusion of the interaction term between company cohesion and wartime stress. We are thus allowing for a heterogeneous treatment effect; that is, while β s > 0, we are allowing for β sc < 0 (or a hazard ratio that is less than 1).
One of the challenges of quantifi cation is the defi nition of company cohesion. Most studies of unit cohesion use either answers to questionnaires or information on how long the unit was together (e.g., Solomon, Mikulincer, and Hobfoll 1987) . We rely on our past work for a revealed preference approach to creating an index of cohesion (Costa and Kahn 2003a, 2003b) . A large literature (summarized in Costa and Kahn 2003a) has shown that people in more diverse communities are less willing to join organizations, volunteer, pay taxes for public goods, and vote than people in more homogeneous communities. A soldier's unit, the men he lives and fi ghts with, has always been his community. As a World War I German student wrote, "The company is the only truly existent community. This community allows neither time nor rest for a personal life. It forces us into its circle, for life is at stake" (Shils and Janowitz 1948) . During the Civil War, this unit consisted of the roughly 100 men in a soldier's company.
Roughly 10% of all Union Army soldiers deserted. They were more likely to desert if they were from more diverse companies, controlling for individual characteristics ( including time of enlistment), ideology, and morale (including recent company deaths) (Costa and Kahn 2003b) . We therefore call a company cohesive if it was less diverse in ethnicity, occupation, and age. As we will discuss in more detail later, we construct an index of company cohesion based on the coeffi cients on company heterogeneity in a desertion regression. Our index weights thus give the effect of company hetero geneity on desertion (and hence arguably cohesion), controlling for other factors, including commitment to the cause and breakdown in combat (as proxied by recent company deaths).
We use several strategies to investigate why stress and social networks might affect health. First, we examine whether stress and social networks affected socioeconomic status at older ages and investigate how our results change if we control for socioeconomic status and health at older ages. Second, assuming that causes of death are independent, we estimate a competing risks model of mortality by cause. Finally, we estimate probit equations to examine what chronic condition veterans who survived to 1915 developed between 1900 and 1915. That is, we estimate
where C is an indicator variable for a specifi c chronic condition, s is our measure of stress, c is our measure of company cohesion, and x is our vector of control variables. If wartime stress increases the probability of developing a chronic condition, then β s > 0. If company cohesion mitigates the effects of wartime stress, then β sc < 0.
DATA
Our data set is based on a sample of roughly 35,000 white men in 303 Union Army infantry companies collected under the auspices of Robert Fogel and available at the Web site of the University of Chicago's Center for Population Economics (http://www.cpe.uchicago .edu). (The full sample contains 39,000 men in 331 companies, but the full sample was not available at the time of analysis. Data on almost 6,000 enlisted men in 52 companies of black troops, also available at this Web site, were not used because relatively few black troops saw intensive action.) All soldiers were linked to the 1850, 1860, 1880, 1900, and 1910 census and to pension records to create a longitudinal data set.
The Union Army pension program began in 1862 to provide assistance to soldiers wounded during the war. In 1890, the program was expanded, and any disability entitled a veteran to a pension, doubling the number of veterans on the rolls overnight. Old age was considered a disability in practice and then became a disability by law in 1907.
Detailed medical records are available for veterans because any veteran who applied for a pension or who wished for a pension increase was examined by a board of surgeons. Ninety-three percent of all men on the pension rolls had an exam. Those who applied on the basis of age were less likely to have an exam and in the analysis are assumed not to have any chronic conditions.
The examining surgeons could note a chronic condition, a symptom, or a sign through sight, touch, feel, and smell. Cardiovascular conditions illustrate how their examinations can be used. We diagnose valvular heart disease from a murmur in the aortic or mitral valve noted in the exam. We diagnose congestive heart failure as concurrent edema, cyanosis, and dyspnea. The examining surgeons diagnosed arteriosclerosis by feeling whether the arteries had hardened. Arteriosclerosis therefore refers to peripheral arteriosclerosis and could be atherosclerosis, an associated disease (such as diabetes), or local infl ammation. The examining surgeons also noted whether the pulse was irregular or bounding and the presence of arrythmia, tachycardia, or bradycardia. The examining surgeons were unable to detect any of the conditions that required modern diagnostic equipment, such as hypertension. However, the team of physicians who reviewed the data reported that if in the fi eld, with no diagnostic equipment, they could not do any better. (For a detailed discussion of potential biases in the surgeons' exams, see Costa 2000 Costa , 2002 .
We restrict our sample to men who were alive and at least age 50 in 1900 and who were on the pension rolls. This leaves us with a sample size of 12,119 men. We also restrict the sample to men for whom we have complete enlistment and discharge information and men who did not change companies. Men who changed companies were most commonly those promoted to offi cer or the original volunteers who enlisted for 90 days and then reenlisted in another company when their term was up. These two sample restrictions reduce the sample size to 7,721 men.
We construct several variables. Our measures of battlefi eld stress are both on the company level, based on the full sample of 35,000 men, and on the regiment level, based on a database compiled from Frederick Dyer's A Compendium of the War of the Rebellion and from William Fox's Regimental Losses in the American Civil War, 1861-1865. (This regiment-level database is available from http://www.cpe.uchicago.edu.) These enable us to examine the fraction of the company dying of wounds (including deaths from septicemia resulting from wounds sustained in action), the number in the company that died of wounds, the number in the regiment killed in action, the maximum number killed in a single engagement, and logarithms of the above. As seen in Figure 1 , during the war, some men were in companies with high death rates from wounds, while others were in companies that suffered no deaths from wounds.
We treat our measures of stress as exogenous; that is, we assume that the characteristics of the company did not determine whether it was placed in a more dangerous place on the battlefi eld. The unit that went into battle was the regiment, and regiments contained both homogeneous and diverse companies. The order of battle was often determined by when a specifi c regiment arrived and if it had had time to rest after its long march.
The more cohesive companies were the ones that were the most homogeneous in birthplace, occupation, and age (Costa and Kahn 2003b) . We therefore construct an index of company cohesion using the hazard ratios from a hazard model predicting time until desertion to weigh company birthplace, occupation, and age diversity. (Our hazard model of time until desertion controls for potential confounders, such as year of enlistment, company mortality rates, ideology in county of enlistment, and own characteristics, such as ethnicity, socioeconomic status, and volunteer status.) Our index for company j, I j , is
where B is birthplace fragmentation, O is occupational fragmentation, A is the coeffi cient of variation of age multiplied by 100, and the αs are the hazard ratios (details are available in the Appendix). We then label as "highly cohesive" a company that was below the median on our index. 4 We also run specifi cations using the individual components of this index to examine which of our diversity measures is the best predictor of older age mortality. However, we lose information by using the individual components of our index of cohesion rather than our index.
Why was there diversity in companies? All regiments were formed locally. Costa and Kahn's (2008:57-73 ) examination of Civil War diaries and letters identifi ed six sources of diversity within companies. The volunteer infantry regiments consisted of 10 companies, each containing roughly 100 men, commanded by a captain and two lieutenants who were often volunteer offi cers drawn from state militias, men of political signifi cance, or other prominent men in the community. At the beginning of the war, men would enlist with one or several friends but rarely with as many as 50. Once companies were full, they would take no more men, and friends would need to fi nd another company or regiment. Men's eagerness to get to the front led them to pick regiments thought to be departing soon, and they quickly left regiments that were late in departing, even enlisting in a regiment of another state. Later in the war, when the new recruits were not so eager, men might enlist in a distant town to receive a large bounty, adding to company diversity. Although a company was generally not replenished with new men when disease, military casualties, and desertions whittled down its numbers, some states added new recruits to existing regiments, and regiments whose members' three-year terms were up were reconstituted with veterans and new men. Finally, the need to travel to recruiting stations increased company diversity. Farmers and farmers' sons had to travel to town to enlist. Small towns could not raise an 4. Although company composition might change with desertions and deaths, we obtain similar results when we use company heterogeneity at the end rather than the beginning of the war. 
Fraction of Company Who Died of Wounds in War
entire company, so their men would enlist elsewhere and do so only with a few friends. Commissioned offi cers were responsible for fi nding their own men and often had to scour the entire state to fi ll their regiments. James Garfi eld, who later became president, traveled throughout Ohio holding revival-style meetings. Statements in soldiers' diaries and letters indicate that they were thrown together with strangers. Amos Stearns, who enlisted with fi ve of his friends, lamented, "Life in the army was very different from life at home. In one place we could choose our companions and those we wished to associate with, but in the army how different" (Kent 1976:214-15) . One soldier wrote home, "We have a remarkable civil and Religious company. . . . I think it is a providencial circumstance that I enlisted in this company for I hear that there is desperate sight of wickedness in the very regiments that I came so near enlisting in" ( letter of David Close, Nov. 4, 1862, 126th Ohio Volunteer Infantry, Company D, http://www . frontierfamilies.net/family/DCletters.htm).
Our control variables are age in 1900, measures of individual wartime stress (whether the soldier was wounded and how severely, POW status, and illnesses experienced), rank, whether the soldier was in a support position, household personal property wealth in 1860, occupation at enlistment, country of birth, if volunteer, population of city of enlistment, if deserter, if illiterate, and fi xed effects for the state served. In addition, we examine whether our fi ndings change when we control for occupation in 1900, marital status in 1900, home ownership in 1900, and body mass index (BMI) circa 1900. Table 1 illustrates how the characteristics of men change from the starting sample of 35,000 soldiers to the war survivors and the pensioners in 1900. Men who survived the war were more likely to be deserters, non-POWs, nonfarmers, support and offi cers, rich, and short. A slight wound rather than no wound or a severe wound increased men's chances of surviving. Men were more likely to have survived the war if they were not ill during the war, particularly from measles, typhoid, a respiratory condition, or smallpox. Men in the more cohesive companies were less likely to survive because they were also the men who were less likely to desert. Although 10% of soldiers deserted, roughly 13% of the surviving soldiers had ever deserted.
Compared with all war survivors, men who were alive and on the pension rolls in 1900 were the nondeserters (deserters were not eligible for a pension), men who enlisted in smaller cities, farmers, the native-born and the German-born (all groups with lower postwar mortality rates), and support and offi cers. Men who were wounded in the war were more likely to be on the pension rolls, as were men who were ill during the war, particularly from cardiovascular causes, smallpox, typhoid, malaria, fever, gastric causes, sunstroke, rheumatic fever, measles, and diarrhea. Even controlling for all other factors, company cohesion was not a statistically signifi cant predictor of being alive and on the pension rolls in 1900.
We cannot observe what happened to men after the war ended and before they entered the pension rolls. Until men entered the pension rolls, they were not at risk of dying (because the pension is our only source of information on date of death), and only after 1890, when pensions became widely available to all veterans, is the sample representative of the veteran population. We begin our analysis in 1900 because linkage to the census provides us with information on socioeconomic variables. If the most traumatized men died before 1900, we may underestimate the effects of wartime stress on older age mortality. When we search for all men known to have survived the war in the 1880 census, we do not fi nd that wartime stress, company cohesion, or the interaction term between wartime stress and company cohesion are statistically signifi cant predictors of being found in the 1880 census and therefore arguably of mortality.
RESULTS
We test three hypotheses. The fi rst is that wartime stress increases mortality at older ages. The second is that company cohesion mitigates the effect of wartime stress on older age Notes: 34,941 soldiers, 30,801 war survivors, and 11,921 pensioners. Pensioners are restricted to men on the pension rolls in 1900 and with known date of death. We created an index of company cohesion based on diversity within a company in birthplace, occupation, and age (see the text for details).
mortality. Company cohesion could buffer the effects of stress if men in more cohesive companies are less likely to develop psychiatric disorders, or it could accentuate the effects of stress if men lose those who are very close to them. The third hypothesis is that company cohesion reduces the effects of wartime stress on the probability of developing cardiovascular disease.
Wartime Stress and Mortality
Survival probabilities were slightly higher among men in companies with low death rates from wounds than among men in companies in the top death rate decile (see Figure 2) . Table 2 shows that the fraction of the company dying of wounds has a statistically significant effect on older age mortality, controlling for many individual characteristics, company cohesion, and state-of-regiment fi xed effects. The fraction of the company dying of wounds has a larger impact on older age mortality than other measures of wartime stress, and the linear form of the specifi cation illustrates this best. The number of men in the company dying of wounds has a stronger effect than the number killed in the regiment. The fraction of men in the company dying of illness also has an effect on older age mortality, but the effect is not as strong as that of the fraction killed; when both are entered simultaneously in the regression, statistical signifi cance on both coeffi cients disappears. However, the coeffi cients are jointly statistically signifi cant. We prefer to use the fraction of men dying of wounds rather than the total fraction dying in the war because the fraction of men dying of illnesses might be a proxy for unobserved individual illness. We fi nd some evidence that the maximum number of men killed in a single battle has an effect on older age mortality, but the effect is nonlinear and not as strong as the fraction of the company dying of wounds. When we include both the logarithm of the maximum number of men killed in a single battle and the total number of men killed in the regiment, statistical signifi cance on both wartime stress measures disappears, but the coeffi cients are jointly statistically significant. We fi nd no evidence that the fraction of the company dying of wounds might proxy for unobserved own probability of being wounded in wartime. When we include whether or not a veteran claimed a wound on his pension application (presumably anyone who was Notes: Th e data are restricted to men on the pension rolls in 1900, with known date of death, who did not change companies, and with both muster-in and discharge information. Analysis time is time in years. Th e survival curve is adjusted for age. Th e top 10th percentile for company death rates from wounds was 8.9%. 
Fraction Notes: Hazard ratios are from a Gompertz model of years until death. Th e data are restricted to men on the pension rolls in 1900, with known date of death, who did not change companies, and with both muster-in and discharge information. Additional control variables are age in 1900; dummy variables indicating whether the veteran had been wounded slightly in the war, whether he had ever been wounded severely, whether he had been a POW early in the war, and whether he had been a POW late in the war; occupation-at-enlistment dummy variables (professional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the omitted category); country-of-birth dummy variables (Britain, Ireland, Germany, and other foreign country, with the United States as the omitted category); dummy variables indicating whether the veteran had been in a support position or had been a commissioned or noncommissioned offi cer; a dummy variable indicating whether the veteran had deserted; the logarithm of household personal property wealth in 1860; a dummy variable indicating that the veteran was illiterate; dummy variables indicating that information on wealth and on literacy was missing; a dummy variable indicating that the veteran had been a volunteer; dummy variables for wartime disease (typhoid, smallpox, respiratory, rheumatic fever, measles, diarrhea, insanity, malaria, fever, syphilis, gonorrhea, hepatitis, and cardiovascular disease); and state-of-regiment fi xed eff ects. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors. 7,494 observations. † p < .10; *p < .05
wounded had every incentive to claim this on the pension), the coeffi cient on the fraction of the company wounded remained roughly similar at 2.119 (σ t = 0.779). We investigate whether there are any interaction effects between personal characteristics and wartime stress. When we control for age at enlistment, we fi nd that men younger than 17 faced an odds of dying that were 1.286 (σ t = 0 .176) times greater than did men aged 17-40.
5 But we fi nd no evidence of any interaction effects between age and wartime stress. We also fi nd no interaction effects between whether a soldier was wounded in the war and wartime stress. We fi nd some suggestive evidence that the Irish and the British were more adversely affected by wartime stress than the native-born, and the Germans less so (interaction effects not shown).
We test whether our estimates of the impact of wartime stress depended on the timing of enlistment and days served. Because companies that were formed earlier fought in the war longer, our measures of wartime stress are greater for companies organized earlier. When we include dummy variables indicating year of enlistment in our specifi cation (results not shown), we fi nd that the hazard ratio on the fraction of the company dying of wounds falls from 2.139 to 1.647 ( σ t = 0.655), statistically indistinguishable from 1. The hazard ratios on the year-of-enlistment dummy variables are individually statistically indistinguishable from 1. However, the hazard ratios on the fraction of the company dying of wounds and the dummy variables indicating year of enlistment are jointly statistically signifi cantly different from 1 (χ 2 (2) = 4.91). Similarly, when we control for days served, we fi nd that the hazard ratio on the fraction of the company dying of wounds falls from 2.139 to 1.900 ( σ t = 0.766) and that the hazard ratio on days served is statistically signifi cantly different from 1. But the hazard ratio on the fraction of the company dying of wounds and the hazard ratio on days served are jointly statistically signifi cantly different from 1 (χ 2 (2) = 5.69). We fi nd no evidence of interaction effects between days served and wartime stress.
Wartime Stress, Cohesion, and Later Outcomes
As shown in Figure 3 , when company death rates from wounds were above the median, men who were in cohesive companies had higher older age survival probabilities than men who were in companies in which cohesion was low. However, when company death rates from wounds were below the median, company cohesion did not affect survival probabilities, suggesting that social support aids stress resistance in high-stress situations but has no effect in low-stress conditions. Table 3 shows that using the fraction of the company dying of wounds, either in a linear or logarithmic form, and controlling for individual characteristics and state-of-regiment fi xed effects, being in a cohesive company reduces the negative effects of stress on older age mortality. (Using other measures of wartime stress reveals a similar pattern.) Cohesion by itself does not affect older age mortality. An increase of 0.01 in the fraction of the company dying of wounds increases the odds of dying by 0.06 for men in an uncohesive company and by 0.01 for men in a cohesive company. The mean of the predicted mortality probabilities for every individual would have been 50.5% if all men had been in an uncohesive company and 49.9% if they had been in a cohesive company. The effects of stress and company cohesion remain roughly the same when we control for socioeconomic status in 1900, marital status in 1900, and health (as proxied by BMI) in 1900. We do not fi nd that wartime stress predicts these control variables, suggesting that we are not uncovering the effects of wartime stress as mediated through socioeconomic status and health in 1900.
We investigate a quartile rather than a median split on company cohesion. Although we lose power by doing so, we fi nd that the difference that matters is that between the two top and two bottom quartiles.
5. When we control for 10-year birth cohorts, the hazard ratio on age less than 17 becomes 1.237 ( σ t = 0.161), still statistically signifi cant at the 10% level.
We might overestimate the extent to which company cohesion mitigated wartime stress if men who sought out more cohesive companies were the men most likely to develop psychiatric disorders or if we are confounding the effects of cohesion with those of home community. However, we do not fi nd that county-of-enlistment characteristics have any predictive power. Finding a company that was a good match was largely a matter of luck. Until the fi rst battle, soldiers could not know if any of their comrades or offi cers were good soldiers because the volunteers were all civilians.
We estimate models of unobserved heterogeneity because some individuals might be more susceptible to stress than others. Assuming that unobserved heterogeneity can be modeled as having a gamma distribution, tests reveal evidence of heterogeneity. However, our basic results remain unchanged. The hazard ratios are 6.844 (σ t = 3.298) on the fraction of the company killed, 1.038 (σ t = 0.388) on the dummy variable for a cohesive company, and 0.154 ( σ t = 0.098) on the interaction between company killed and the dummy variable for a cohesive company.
We also investigate whether the degree of company cohesiveness depends on the timing of enlistment. Although the weights used for our index of cohesion control for the timing of enlistment, we may not fully capture that early companies were the more cohesive companies. We therefore ran our specifi cation including a dummy variable for early enlistment (enlistment in 1861) and the interaction of this dummy variable with our measure of company cohesion. The resulting hazard ratios on our dummy variable for enlistment and on the interaction term of this dummy variable with our measure of company cohesion are, Notes: Th e data are restricted to men on the pension rolls in 1900, with known date of death, who did not change companies, and with both muster-in and discharge information. Analysis time is time in years. Survival curves are adjusted for age. Th e median company death rate from wounds was 2.7%. 
Analysis Time
High Low b. Death rates from wounds below the median respectively, 0.989 (σ t = 0.084) and 2.901 ( σ t = 3.365), both statistically indistinguishable from 1. (Using enlistment prior to 1863 made little difference to our results.) The hazard ratios on the fraction of the company wounded and the interaction term between the fraction of the company wounded and our measure of company cohesion are, respectively, 4.858 (σ t = 2.254) and 0.167 ( σ t = 0.097), both highly statistically signifi cant from 1. We investigate different specifi cations of the hazard. Again, our basic results remain unchanged. For example, when we estimate a Weibull model, we obtain hazard ratios of 5.248 ( σ t = 2.082) and 0.196 ( σ t = 0.101) on the fraction of the company dying of wounds and on the interaction term between the fraction of the company killed and the dummy variable for a cohesive company. Table 4 shows that the most statistically signifi cant interaction effects on mortality are seen in mortality from ischemic heart disease and stroke. An increase of 0.01 in the company killed increases the odds of dying from ischemic heart disease and stroke by 0.50 for men in uncohesive companies, but by only 0.02 for men in high-cohesion companies. The effects on the odds of dying of a respiratory disease are even larger, but the standard errors are very large as well. We fi nd no interaction effects between wartime stress and company cohesion on other causes of death.
When we examine the probability of men who lived until 1915 developing a heart condition between 1900 and 1915, we fi nd that men in a more cohesive company were less likely to develop arteriosclerosis and bounding pulse than men in an uncohesive company (see Table 5 ). The predicted probability of developing heart disease is 0.138 for men in an uncohesive company and 0.127 for men in a cohesive company. The predicted probability of developing bounding pulse is 0.081 for men in an uncohesive company and 0.068 for men in a cohesive company. Notes: Hazard ratios are from a Gompertz model of years until death. Th e data are restricted to men on the pension rolls in 1900, with known date of death, who did not change companies, and with both muster-in and discharge information. Additional control variables are age in 1900; dummy variables indicating whether the veteran had been wounded slightly in the war, whether he had ever been wounded severely, whether he had been a POW early in the war, and whether he had been a POW late in the war; occupation-at-enlistment dummy variables (professional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the omitted category); country-of-birth dummy variables (Britain, Ireland, Germany, and other foreign country, with the United States as the omitted category); dummy variables indicating whether the veteran had been in a support position or had been a commissioned or noncommissioned offi cer; a dummy variable indicating whether the veteran had deserted; the logarithm of household personal property wealth in 1860; a dummy variable indicating that the veteran was illiterate; dummy variables indicating that information on wealth and on literacy was missing; a dummy variable indicating that the veteran had been a volunteer; dummy variables for wartime disease (typhoid, smallpox, respiratory, rheumatic fever, measles, diarrhea, insanity, malaria, fever, syphilis, gonorrhea, hepatitis, and cardiovascular disease); and state-of-regiment fi xed eff ects. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors. Specifi cations 1, 2, and 3 contain 7,494 observations. Specifi cations 4 and 5 contain 6,845 observations. † p < .10; *p < .05;**p < .01; ***p < .001 Notes: Hazard ratios are from a Gompertz model of years until death by cause. Competing causes of death are assumed to be independent. Th e data are restricted to men on the pension rolls in 1900, with known date of death, who did not change companies, and with both muster-in and discharge information. Additional control variables are age in 1900; dummy variables indicating whether the veteran had been wounded slightly in the war, whether he had ever been wounded severely, whether he had been a POW early in the war, and whether he had been a POW late in the war; occupation-at-enlistment dummy variables (professional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the omitted category); country-of-birth dummy variables (Britain, Ireland, Germany, and other foreign country, with the United States as the omitted category); dummy variables indicating whether the veteran had been in a support position or had been a commissioned or noncommissioned offi cer; a dummy variable indicating whether the veteran had deserted; the logarithm of household personal property wealth in 1860; a dummy variable indicating that the veteran was illiterate; dummy variables indicating that information on wealth and on literacy was missing; a dummy variable indicating that the veteran had been a volunteer; dummy variables for wartime disease (typhoid, smallpox, respiratory, rheumatic fever, measles, diarrhea, insanity, malaria, fever, syphilis, gonorrhea, hepatitis, and cardiovascular disease); and state-of-regiment fi xed eff ects. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors. 3,650 observations. † p < .10; *p < .05;**p < .01; ***p < .001 1900 and 1915 . Th e dependent variables in the last two regressions are equal to 1 if the veteran developed bounding pulse between 1900 and 1915. Th e samples are restricted to veterans alive in 1915, age 50-64 in 1900, and who did not have arteriosclerosis or bounding pulse, respectively, in 1900. Th e samples are also restricted to men on the pension rolls in 1900, with known date of death, who did not change companies, and with both muster-in and discharge information. Additional control variables are age in 1900; dummy variables indicating whether the veteran had been wounded slightly in the war, whether he had ever been wounded severely, whether he had been a POW early in the war, and whether he had been a POW late in the war; occupation-at-enlistment dummy variables (professional or proprietor, artisan, laborer, and unknown, with farmer as the omitted category); country-of-birth dummy variables (Britain, Ireland, Germany, and other foreign country, with the United States as the omitted category); dummy variables indicating whether the veteran had been in a support position or had been a commissioned or noncommissioned offi cer; a dummy variable indicating whether the veteran had deserted; the logarithm of household personal property wealth in 1860; a dummy variable indicating that the veteran was illiterate; dummy variables indicating that information on wealth and on literacy was missing; a dummy variable indicating that the veteran had been a volunteer; dummy variables for wartime disease (typhoid, smallpox, respiratory, rheumatic fever, measles, diarrhea, insanity, malaria, fever, syphilis, gonorrhea, hepatitis, and cardiovascular disease); quarter-of-birth dummy variables (including one for missing); and state-of-regiment fi xed eff ects. Numbers in parentheses are clustered standard errors. 2,821 observations in the arteriosclerosis regression and 2,592 observations in the bounding pulse regression. † p < .10; **p < .01
Bounding pulse is often associated with high blood pressure or fluid overload. Although we present results for arteriosclerosis and bounding pulse in the same table, they can be almost considered mutually exclusive physical fi ndings because arteriosclerosis is accompanied by occlusive disease and hence decreased pulse on examination. We fi nd that while 27% of men with arteriosclerosis in 1915 had ever had bounding pulse in an examination, 73% of them had ever had a weak pulse in an examination.
There are no differences in the rates of developing valvular heart disease, congestive heart failure, or other heart rate abnormalities by company cohesion. As a falsifi cation exercise, we examine the effects of company cohesion and stress on the probability of developing a hernia between 1900 and 1915 among men who did have a hernia in 1900 (4,430 observations). Because hernias result from unusual pressure on the abdomen, such as that due to heavy lifting, obesity, or even aging, there should be no effects, and we fi nd none. The derivatives on the fraction of the company that was wounded and the interaction term between the fraction of the company that was wounded and company cohesion are -0.061 (σ t = 0.126) and -0.036 ( σ t = 0.159), respectively. Company cohesion mitigates the effects of stress largely through birthplace and age cohesion effects. When we run a specifi cation in which we include measures of whether a company was below the mean in birthplace, occupation, and age homogeneity and interact these with our measures of wartime stress, we fi nd that the coeffi cient on the fraction of the company dying of wounds is 1.968 ( σ t = 0.784) and that the interaction terms on birthplace and age homogeneity are 0.789 (σ t = 0.209) and 0.707 (σ t = 0.164), respectively. In contrast, the interaction term on occupation homogeneity is 2.150 (σ t = 0.423).
CONCLUSION
We fi nd that being in a more cohesive company reduced the negative, long-term consequences of wartime stress. The strongest effect of wartime stress on older age mortality and on the probability of developing specifi c conditions was observed for ischemic and stroke causes of death and the probability of developing arteriosclerosis and bounding pulse. Men exposed to wartime stress were less likely to develop cardiovascular disorders later in life if they were in more cohesive companies than if they were in uncohesive companies.
We suspect that men under stress who developed cardiovascular conditions later in life suffered from undiagnosed psychiatric conditions. Why might men who faced similar stress levels but were in more cohesive companies never develop psychiatric conditions? We can rule out a positive effect of peers on risk avoidance. Because men in more cohesive companies were less likely to desert, they also faced a higher risk of death. Having a social support network may have led men to reappraise battlefi eld threats or provided emotional consolation after battle. Although our results are derived from a past population, it is one of the few human populations to provide us with measures of stress, of long-run outcomes, and of exogenous social networks.
Studies of the negative health effects of stress in recent populations have attracted a great deal of attention (e.g., Geronimus 1992; Marmot and Wilkinson 1999) . Stress was by no means the most important predictor of older age mortality in past populations. For example, the negative impact of growing up in a large city (where infectious diseases were common and nutritional status was poorer) was much greater than the effect of wartime stress (Costa and Lahey 2005) . Although our results suggest that declines in psychological stress played at most a small role in long-run improvements in elderly health and longevity, stress may become a relatively more important factor in developed-country populations as early-life conditions have improved.
DATA APPENDIX
Our index of cohesion is based on the regression described below and given in Appendix Notes: Days until desertion are measured from fi rst mustering-in. Standard errors are clustered on the company. Signifi cance of all coeffi cients is for equality of all coeffi cients to 1. Men who died, became POWs, were discharged, were missing in action, or changed companies before fi rst desertion are treated as censored. Covariates include height in inches and dummy variables indicating missing information for occupation, the 1860 census, literacy, and county voting. Included region fi xed eff ects are for Middle Atlantic, East North Central, West North Central, Border, and West (with New England as the omitted category).
Source: Costa and Kahn (2003b) . † p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01
Coeffi cient of variation for age. We calculated, by company, the coeffi cient of variation for age at enlistment.
Population in city of enlistment. We obtained population in city of enlistment from Union Army Recruits in White Regiments in the United States, 1861 -1865 , Robert W. Fogel, Stanley L. Engerman, Clayne Pope, and Larry Wimmer, Principal Investigators. Cities that could not be identifi ed were assumed to be cities of population less than 2,500.
Ideology Variables
Year of muster. Dummy variables indicating the year that the soldier was fi rst mustered in.
Volunteer. A dummy variable equal to 1 if the recruit was a volunteer instead of a draftee or a substitute.
Percent of vote in 1860 presidential election. We obtained by county of enlistment the fraction of the vote cast for Lincoln and for other candidates from Electoral Data for Counties in the United States: Presidential and Congressional Races, 1840-1972 (ICPSR 8611) , Jerome M. Clubb, William H. Flanigan, and Nancy H. Zingale, Principal Investigators. Because we cannot attribute a county to each recruit, our categories are percent in county of enlistment voting for Lincoln, other candidate, and unknown.
Morale Variables
Fraction in company dying. We calculated, by company, the fraction dying overall and the fraction dying (among all men at risk to die) within all half-years that each recruit served. Our means present the fraction dying overall. Our regression results use the time-varying covariate fraction of men at risk of dying during all half-years that each recruit served.
Fraction of major Union victories. This is a time-varying variable that indicates for each half-year that the recruit was in the service the fraction of major Union victories to all major battles in that half-year. It takes the value 0 if there were no major battles.
Our cohesion index uses the coeffi cients on birthplace fragmentation, on occupation fragmentation, and of variation for age. We tested whether measures of county-level fragmentation for the male population of military age perform better than our company fragmentation measures. Higher birthplace fragmentation in county of enlistment increased desertion rates, but the effect is not statistically signifi cant. We fi nd no effect at all of county-level occupational fragmentation.
We also investigate using alternative measures of birthplace and occupational diversity, such as percentage of own nativity or occupation and concentration ratios. Concentration ratios for birthplace and occupation are collinear, but individually, a higher concentration ratio signifi cantly decreases the probability of desertion. Measures such as percentage of own nativity or occupation are not suited to the Union Army data because there was no dominant ethnic group. However, we fi nd that laborers were more likely to desert if the proportion of laborers in the company was high.
